Abstract
Introduction
We examine enterprise-level union influence in post-socialist countries (PSCs), seeking to discover its antecedents. Research on union influence at enterprise level in post-socialist Europe is sparse, despite unions retaining highly decentralised structures and funds. Yet influential unions at enterprise level are more likely to provide a solid basis for the European Union (EU) "social dialogue" processes; conversely, uninfluential unions at this level may eventually erode the "European model". We find that union density, collaborative HRM and the business cycle are all significant antecedents of union influence and that previous national level estimates are a useful but imprecise guide to enterprise level influence.
We begin by explaining management and union roles pre-1989. Next, we outline contextual changes for unionism during "transition", arguing that different forms of HRM will be associated with different levels of union influence. Next, we introduce our data and analytic methods. Finally, we outline our findings and offer tentative explanations for them. their ability to conduct social dialogue (Mailand and Due, 2004) , to carry out extra-judicial action (Welz and Kauppinen, 2005) and to defend women members (Pollert, 2005) .
Unions made efforts to become more mobilising and bargaining bodies after 1990 (Gennard, 2007; Croucher and Cotton, 2009 ). Yet extensive qualitative functional change has proved difficult and it remains unclear how far their efforts have succeeded, drawing mixed verdicts from experts. Thirkell et al. (1998) cited MSzOSz in Hungary and CITUB in Bulgaria as reformed federations, which were stronger than previously. Gennard (2007), analysing print unions" positions, passed a more qualified judgement. Crowley (2004) went further, arguing that many unions remained unreformed, helping explain labour quiescence, while King (2007) characterises Central European unions as highly ineffective.
Unions at enterprise level may have certain limited resources buttressing their influence. First, high union density may provide representative legitimacy and underpin some prospect of direct influence (Vernon, 2006) . Second, management can concede union influence to help them effect change (Crowley, 2004; Croucher, 2010) . This may be buttressed by the legal watchdog role, union welfare functions and continued identification with it as an institutional embodiment of the "labour collective". The legal watchdog role acquires particular significance where relatively strong worker protection remains in place, as in some countries (Trif, 2005) . Finally, they may exercise indirect influence on management by diffusing discontent on the shop floor (Gomez-Mejia and Welburne, 1994) .
In short, union influence may be based either on direct or indirect influence; management may use the latter to shape a form of unionism presenting little challenge to management prerogative.
Forms of HRM
"HRM" is used by Western companies, to some extent by private companies and even occasionally in the state sector (Brewster et al., 2005) . Forms of HRM all emphasise alignment of employer and employee interests, but vary considerably. Gooderham et al. (1999; identified two forms that reflect on the one hand American and on the other West European approaches: "calculative" and "collaborative" HRM. "Calculative" HRM treats labour as an abstract factor of production, stressing individualised reward, appraisal and employee development monitoring systems. "Collaborative" approaches have a more humanistic orientation, viewing employees as active partners, and emphasising intensive downward communication with all levels of employee (Gooderham et al., 1999) .
Collaborative approaches are part of "relational" policies (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005) and, as Gooderham et al. acknowledge , have much in common with "soft" HRM (Storey, 2001 ).
The Gooderham et al. typology does not reflect a full set of "soft" HRM practices; the "soft" characterisation explicitly includes an attitude to unionisation.
We adopt this conceptualisation because it captures two paradigmatic sets of practices.
We prefer the Gooderham et al. conceptualisation to the vaguer, normative/prescriptive "hard" and "soft" HRM dichotomy (see for example Storey, 2001 ). The Gooderham et al. typology (unlike the "hard" and "soft" conceptualisation) also has the advantage that it treats unions as exogenous and there is therefore no problem of endogeneity in measurement.
"Calculative" HRM, as we show below, is the form usually adopted by private companies in the PSCs. It allows and reflects, as the concept"s authors explain, higher levels of management choice. Gooderham et al. (1999) argue that calculative HRM is strongly linked to managements" wish to increase their autonomy and scope for initiative.
Individualised pay systems have been adopted and promoted to other companies by MNCs operating in the PSCs (EFILWC, 2009). Gooderham et al. (1999) suggest that calculative HRM is closely associated with reduced union influence in Western Europe; unions resist it, but not the collaborative form. This is because it is based on a negative view of collective representation and emphasises individual assessment and reward. This may also have an effect in the PSCs, both by concrete results such as reducing the material significance of collective bargaining and also in a more diffuse way by sending the message to employees that collective institutions are unwelcome.
However, as we outlined above, in the PSCs both union functions and members" perceptions of what these should be, are fundamentally different from that in much of the rest of the world. In other societies, and especially in the liberal market economies, we would not expect welfare and affective considerations to have similar relevance. In our analysis we therefore include the UK as a benchmark, since we expect calculative HRM to have a marked negative effect on union influence there, as Gooderham et al."s theory predicts. We therefore propose the hypothesis: In PSCs, Calculative HRM is associated with lower union influence than the Collaborative form, but less so than in the UK benchmark.
Data and variables
Our data derive from the 2003/2004 round of CRANET, an international enterprise level survey of HRM practices conducted at regular intervals since 1989 across a large number of countries by a well-established international research network. CRANET is by far the most comprehensive international survey of HR policies and practices at the organizational level.
The survey encompasses all areas of economic activity, but excludes firms employing less than 100 staff and targets organizations employing more than 200. Respondent firms are chosen to reflect the broad industrial composition by employment within each country surveyed. It covers private and public organizations in 22 European countries, as well as some dozen others (Brewster et al., 2005) . It is directed at HR managers or, in the absence of a HR manager, the senior manager responsible for HR issues, and predominantly uses closed questions on policies and practices rather than attitudes. This ensures unambiguous responses on actual policies and practices. The questions are agreed by the network, translated into the appropriate language and then back-translated into English to identify any problems with international meaning and comparability. In the countries involved in our sample, the survey was administered by post. Data collection in these countries poses considerable and specific difficulties (Drzewiecka, 2007) . There is a tradition of secrecy (Danilovich and Croucher, 2011) , partially overcome by using local researchers in each country. Full technical details are available in Brewster et al. (2005) .
We use data from all the available PSCs (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and, as a liberal market economy benchmark, from the UK. These countries exhibit diverse institutional settings and include a Balkan country (Bulgaria) as well as a Baltic one (Estonia) and a group of significant Central European economies. All are members of the EU. We also include in our sample firms that are part of multinational companies (MNCs). The incidence of MNCs in our sample exhibits a pattern consistent with aggregate statistics on MNCs" presence in the region (WIIW, 2003) .
Our main dependent variable is union influence at firm level (TUIN) measured as a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when managers report some union influence and zero otherwise. Managers are asked whether union influence has increased, decreased or remained the same over the previous three years, or if no union influence existed. We classify the first three categories as "some influence" and the last as "no influence". We believe that treating the question in this way provides reliable information; we experimentally re-defined the variable by excluding the "decreased" category but the results, available on request, remained qualitatively the same. It is impossible using these data to distinguish between "direct" and "indirect" influence as we do on the theoretical level. We also analyse unions" presence (TUPR) in firms which is measured as a scale with six categories according to the share of firm employees in union membership.
2 Verma et al. (2002) argue that union density is the best overall indicator of union influence. Thus, by using both TUIN and TUPR we believe that we achieve the most reliable indication of whether union influence exists. Table 1 demonstrates the high correlations (Pearson correlation coefficients) of TUIN and TUPR both by country and for the total PSCs and UK samples.
- Table 1 about here -
In extended regressions, we use two measures of the two major types of labour management practices as formulated by Gooderham et al. (1998; 1999) (Mokken and Lewis, 1982) to compute our synthetic HRM indices as in Gooderham et al. (1999) . The unweighted sum of item scores must be monotonously related to the latent true scores, as demonstrated by Sjitsma et al. (1990 Tables A1a and A1b for the PSC and UK samples respectively.
In Table 2 we report summary statistics on union influence, the prevalence of calculative and collaborative HRM practices, on MNC presence (measured as a share of surveyed firms) and the importance of private ownership by country, for all PSCs in our sample. The summary statistics confirm that our data approximate to the empirical facts established by other studies using different data sources.
- Table 2 about hereFollowing the conceptual frameworks of Gooderham et al. (1998; 1999) Table 3 . Correlation matrices for selected regression variables are presented in the Appendix, Tables A2a and A2b for PSCs and UK samples respectively. The low correlations between regression variables indicate no endogeneity problems.
- Table 3 about here -
Econometric analysis

Determinants of union influence
Given that the dependent variable of main interest (union influence) is dichotomous we first estimate relationships by a Probit regression and report the estimation results (marginal effects) in Table 4a for the PSCs and in Table 4b for the UK. Following Gooderham et al. (1999) and Rizov and Croucher (2009) we start with a base specification where the explanatory variables are simply the main firm characteristics. In a second extended specification we add information on private and foreign ownership. Next, the specification (in Table 4a ) also includes a set of PSCs dummy variables which capture variations in institutional specificities across countries, with reference to the Czech Republic. We further extend the specification with a measure of market conditions, and subsequently add a set of industry dummy variables with aggregate services as the reference category. The stability of coefficients in all regressions when introducing stepwise explanatory variables indicates no endogeneity problems. 3 Nevertheless, we are cautious in drawing conclusions regarding causality and interpret our results simply as evidence of correlations between variables. We conceptualise the results as showing a mutually-determined relationship; since management clearly has control, its policies are of great significance but union policies and practices are likely to have some impact on the relationships.
- Table 4a about here-- Significantly, the business cycle is negatively correlated with union influence in PSCs:
in periods of favourable market conditions influence is low but increases when the business cycle moves unfavourably. Adding a set of industry controls reproduces the results from previous specifications and also suggests important differences across industries. Given aggregate services as a reference category, union influence is stronger in primary industries and manufacturing, while in the construction sector it is similar to services.
Finally, in this section we extend the last specification, considering the association of HRM with union influence and report our results in column (6), Table 4a and column (5), Table 4b for the PSCs and the UK samples respectively. Interestingly, the two HRM scales" coefficients exhibit the same pattern but differ in magnitudes for the two samples as verified by Wald tests, which are significant at 5 percent level. For the PSC sample the coefficients of COLL and CALC are smaller in magnitude, confirming our discussion above about the processes and their probable effects on union influence. For the UK sample, the pattern is as expected: the coefficient of COLL is positive while the coefficient of CALC is negative; both are highly statistically significant.
We now consider the possibility that union influence and HRM practices as measured by the CALC and COLL scales are simultaneously determined. We conceive of union influence as arising from interactive, negotiated processes between management and unions. To test and control for simultaneity we specify a system of three equations and estimate it by SURE (seemingly unrelated regression). SURE uses the asymptotically efficient, feasible, GLS algorithm (described in Greene, 2003, pp. 340-362) and jointly estimates the three regressions, each with its own error term as errors are allowed to be correlated. Stepwise expansion of the equation specifications follows the same pattern as in Tables 4a and 4b .
Estimation results for the union influence equation are reported in Tables 5a and 5b Tables 5a and 5b is that the coefficients appear very similar to those reported in Tables 4a and 4b respectively. The fact that the coefficient signs are the same and the magnitudes are very similar suggests that our results are robust. Further, a Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) of independence (no correlation of residuals) rejects the hypothesis of zero correlation of the residuals and implies that union influence and HRM practices indeed are correlated and likely to be simultaneously determined.
5
- Tables 6a and 6b , and appear qualitatively similar to the results for union influence reported in Tables 5a and 5b . The dependent variable, TUPR is a scale with six categories rather than a dichotomous one, meaning that the coefficients are not directly comparable in terms of magnitudes. 6 The signs of the estimated coefficients are the same while the coefficient magnitudes appear proportionately similar. This qualitative similarity
indicates that the degree of unions" presence likely approximates to their influence.
- Table 6a about here-- Table 6b about here-
Discussion and conclusions
The paper"s main contribution is to show the antecedents of union influence at enterprise level in the PSCs. While both forms of HRM have the expected associations with union influence, these are more muted than in the UK. Union influence is also associated with high union density, negative movements in the business cycle and institutional specificities in certain countries. National patterns are broadly as anticipated from national-level studies, but the relationship between national and enterprise influence is not entirely symmetrical.
Our attempts to explain our findings relate to the continued and positive importance of legacy union functions in the PSCs. Unions have certain positive resources: indirect union influence may derive, particularly among older workers, from conceptions of the union as welfare provider and this may be more relevant than pre-1989 as job security is now hugely reduced. It may also reflect continued identification with the union as an institutional embodiment of the labour collective. Collaborative HRM reflects an approach that is more positive towards institutional forms of employee voice but its weaker effects than in the UK may also reflect the welfare orientation.
The country results confirm that our outliers in terms of national level considerations, Slovenia and Estonia, show high and low enterprise level union influence respectively, reflecting common estimates of their national influence. In the national "middle range", union influence in enterprises is similar in both parts of the ex-Czechoslovakia despite Slovakia"s relatively "highly-organised" industrial relations (Stockhammer and Onaran, 2009), suggesting the relevance of these countries" shared historic legacy.
Extrapolation from national level estimates of union influence is not universally valid. We find a strong relationship between union influence and membership levels which supports Verma et al. (2002) . Where union density is zero, the result is hardly surprising since no influence can be expected, but influence becomes more common with higher density.
This may be interpreted in different ways and our "no influence" finding may be more useful than the "influence" one, being clearer in its meaning. This constitutes a limitation of our analysis since the latter undifferentiated category may conceal much variation. On the other hand, requesting nuanced responses would introduce a major inter-rater reliability problem.
Reaching a nuanced and context-sensitive assessment of union influence requires case study work.
PSCs, consistent with the thesis that union legal watchdog and welfare functions remain significant: employer and worker demands for these services will likely be higher when enterprises are in difficulty. It underlines the continuing significance of legal requirements that unions are consulted on redundancies in some countries (Broughton, 2009 ). The finding is consistent with Bulgarian findings that the onset of redundancy increases levels of union bargaining over its terms (Tomev et al., 2008 rather than using funds for enterprise survival. The success of restructuring policies is conditional on eliminating the soft budget constraints (Konings et al., 2003; Rizov, 2005) , directly linked to abandoning the state"s role in ensuring full employment.
2 The six categories are defined as follows: category 0 corresponds to 0 percent share, 1 -1-10 percent, 2 -11-25 percent, 3 -26-50 percent, 4 -51-75 percent and 5 -76-100 percent.
3 In all regressions we have included as controls for a possible measurement error, due to self-reporting, variables describing key respondent characteristics. The individual-level control variables are gender, education, years of service in the organization and we assume that they are not correlated with the firm-level variables. Individual-level controls were neither individually nor jointly statistically significant in any regression and therefore their coefficients were not reported. 4 We test for differences in coefficients for the PSC and UK samples using Wald tests and find that jointly for all coefficients the differences are significant at 10 percent level or better for the majority of the models.
5 The Breusch-Pagan Chi-square statistic -a Lagrange Multiplier statistic -rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation in all regressions and is significant at 1 percent level or better. Level of significance of estimated coefficients is indicated as follows: 1 percent ***, 5 percent **, 10 percent *. COLL and CALC HRM scales are in logs. Reference country is Czech Republic and reference industry is "various services". Level of significance of estimated coefficients is indicated as follows: 1 percent ***, 5 percent **, 10 percent *. Level of significance of estimated coefficients is indicated as follows: 1 percent ***, 5 percent **, 10 percent.
Table 5b Determinants of union influence in the UK (SUR estimator)
Variables Models (1) (2) (3)(4)
